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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. "MARY CARTER" AGREEMENTS SUBJECT TO JURY DISCLOSURE
In Poston v. Barnes1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that "any settlement device which does not fully release a
defendant, while purporting to do so, is subject to disclosure to
the jury."2 The decision followed and expanded the majority
rule that "Mary Carter" agreements may be introduced into
evidence.
This action arose from an automobile accident that occurred
as Poston, a high school student, was travelling in a van owned
by Florence County School District #2. As the van passed
through an intersection, Barnes failed to stop for a stop sign and
collided with the van. As a result of this impact, Poston was
thrown out of the van.' He filed suit against Barnes and Flo-
rence County School District for damages. While the suit was
pending, Barnes and her insurance carrier entered into a settle-
ment agreement with Poston entitled "Agreement and Covenant
Not to Execute or Proceed Against Norwell Barnes."4 The agree-
ment provided that Barnes would remain a party defendant but
would pay Poston $180,000 over a period of years. Poston agreed
not to execute on any judgment against Barnes for any amount
in excess of $500 above the $180,000 settlement.' Poston stipu-
lated that the school district would be entitled to a setoff for the
present value of the settlement.'
The covenant was fully disclosed to the school district's at-
torney, who moved that the document be introduced into evi-
dence; the motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict for
1. 294 S.C. 261, 363 S.E.2d 888 (1987).
2. Id. at 265, 363 S.E.2d at 890.
3. Id. at 262, 363 S.E.2d at 889.
4. The court defined a covenant not to execute as "a promise not to enforce a
right of action or execute a judgment when one had such a right at the time of entering
into the agreement." Id. at 264, 363 S.E.2d at 890 (citations omitted). The court noted
that a covenant not to execute is similar to a covenant not to sue in that neither operates
to release other joint tortfeasors. Id. (citations omitted).
5. Id. at 263, 363 S.E.2d at 889.
6. Id.
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$375,000 against the defendants. 7 The school district appealed,'
alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the cove-
nant into evidence." The supreme court reversed, holding that
the covenant should have been allowed into evidence "to insure
that an equitable verdict was reached." 10
On appeal, the school district argued that the trial court's
refusal to disclose the covenant to the jury made Barnes a
"sham" defendant, thereby resulting in a prejudicial verdict." It
argued specifically that the covenant constituted a "Mary
Carter" agreement, so named after the agreement considered in
Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co. 2 The term "Mary Carter"
agreement was defined by the Florida District Court of Appeals
in Maule Industries v. Rountree:3
The term ... now appears to be used rather generally to apply
to any agreement between the plaintiff and some (but less than
all) defendants whereby the parties place limitations on the fi-
nancial responsibility of the agreeing defendants, the amount
of which is variable and usually in some inverse ratio to the
amount of recovery which the plaintiff is able to make against
the nonagreeing defendant or defendants. "
The prevailing view is that a "Mary Carter" agreement must be
7. Since Barnes and the school district were sued as cotortfeasors, they would
have been jointly and severally liable.
8. The supreme court's decision also addresses other alleged errors by the trial
court. This article is limited to the covenant not to execute issue.
9. Since the school district was entitled to a setoff for the present value of the
settlement, the lower court judge found that no prejudice would result. Brief of Respon-
dent at 11.
10. 294 S.C. at 265, 363 S.E.2d at 890.
11. The school district argued that nondisclosure of the covenant to the jury would
have the following effects: first, it would "permit insurance carriers to avoid full payment
of their coverage obligations"; second, it would "permit plaintiffs to finance and prolong
their litigation against nonagreeing defendants"; and third, it would "permit deception
of the jury, thereby allowing the jury, unwittingly, to saddle the nonagreeing defendants
with liability for the debts of the agreeing defendant, an inequitous and undesirable
shifting of liability." Brief of Appellant at 18-19.
12. 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), overruled, Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d
385 (Fla. 1973). The agreement in Mary Carter Paint Co. was structured as follows: In
the event of a verdict against the defendants for less than $37,500, the agreeing defend-
ants would contribute the difference between the verdict and that sum, but the total
amount of that contribution could not exceed $12,500. If a verdict was returned in excess
of $37,500, the agreeing defendants would pay nothing. 202 So. 2d at 10.
13. 264 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), modified, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973).
14. 264 So. 2d at 446 n.1.
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss1/12
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
disclosed to the jury.15
Even though the court held that the covenant between Pos-
ton and Barnes could be disclosed to the jury, it declined to con-
strue the covenant as a "Mary Carter" agreement.16 The court's
decision, however, was based solely on Ward v. Ochoa,' a case
that expressly addressed and disapproved "Mary Carter" agree-
ments. 8 Relying on the policy argument in Ward, the court con-
cluded: "The search for the truth, in order to give justice to the
litigants, is the primary duty of the courts. Secret agreements
between plaintiffs and one or more of several multiple defend-
ants can tend to mislead judges and juries, and border on
collusion."19
This decision will ensure that the jury is entitled to all in-
formation necessary to determine an equitable verdict. The jury
will be apprised of all remuneration available to the plaintiff,
and the sources of such remuneration. As a result, the jury will
have an opportunity to weigh differently the testimony and con-
duct of the agreeing defendant as related to the nonagreeing
defendants.20
While full disclosure to the jury will correct several of the
problems created for the nonagreeing defendant, full disclosure
itself may create potential problems. If parties to the agreement
know in advance that the agreement will be introduced into evi-
15. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Little, 276 Ark. 511, 514, 639 S.W.2d
726, 728 (1982); Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1973); Gatto v. Walgreen Drug
Co., 61 Ill. 2d 513, 523-24, 337 N.E.2d 23, 29 (1975); General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki,
286 Md. 714, 729-30, 410 A.2d 1039, 1046-47 (1980); Grillo v. Burke's Paint Co., 275 Or.
421, 426-27, 551 P.2d 449, 452 (1976).
16. 294 S.C. 261, 265 n.3, 363 S.E.2d 888, 890 n.3. The covenant does not meet the
classic definition of a "Mary Carter" agreement. See supra notes 12-14 and accompany-
ing text. Barnes was absolutely bound to pay the structured settlement as agreed, re-
gardless of the verdict reached by the jury. She was not entitled to any reduction or
refund based on the verdict. As a result, there was no financial inducement for Barnes to
cooperate with the plaintiff.
17. 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
18. The Ward court held that "[i]f the agreement shows that the signing defendant
will have his maximum liability reduced by increasing the liability of one or more co-
defendants, such agreement should be admitted into evidence." Id. at 387.
19. 294 S.C. at 265, 363 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Ward, 284 So. 2d at 387).
20. The defendant school district did not argue that codefendant Barnes cooper-
ated with Poston. Brief of Respondent at 15. Nonetheless, secret agreements could pro-
vide an incentive for collusive nonadversarial proceedings between the plaintiff and
agreeing defendant. See Note, The Mary Carter Agreement - Solving the Problems of
Collusive Settlements in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393, 1398-1403 (1974).
1988]
3
Roach et al.: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
dence, the possible result would be an agreement filled with self-
serving recitals.21 This problem may be avoided, however, if the
court edits the agreement by striking prejudicial and self-serving
statements, thereby presenting the jury with only the basic
framework of the agreement.22
The Poston court expressly stated that its decision "does
not change or alter existing procedure under which a covenant
not to sue shall not be disclosed to the jury but may only be
considered by the trial judge."23 A cotortfeasor who enters into a
covenant not to sue with the plaintiff will not be a party to the
litigation.2 In contrast, a codefendant who enters into a "Mary
Carter" or similar settlement agreement remains a party to the
action, thereby raising the allegation that he is in fact a "sham"
defendant.
Poston is a warning to practitioners that settlement agree-
ments with one codefendant will be scrutinized carefully. The
court's holding is broad: "[A]ny settlement device which does
not fully release a defendant, while purporting to do so, is sub-
ject to disclosure to the jury., 25
Sharon S. Roach
II. PRIVITY REQUIREMENT LIMITED IN RES JUDICATA AND
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL CASES
In Wyndham v. Lewis26 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals limited the privity requirement in cases involving either
res judicata or collateral estoppel. This recent definitional trend
makes it more difficult for courts in civil cases to find that a
second suit is precluded on either of these grounds.
In order for the principles of res judicata or collateral estop-
pel to apply,27 two separate lawsuits must be at issue .2  In
21. Note, supra note 20, at 1411.
22. Id. at 1413. See also Bechtel Jewelers v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 455 So. 2d
383 (Fla. 1984).
23. 294 S.C. at 265 n.2, 363 S.E.2d at 890 n.2.
24. See Bartholomew v. McCartha, 255 S.C. 489, 179 S.E.2d 912 (1971).
25. 294 S.C. at 265, 363 S.E.2d at 890 (emphasis added).
26. 292 S.C. 6, 354 S.E.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1987).
27. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel will be used interchangea-
bly here with respect toward the privity prerequisite. For a distinction between the two,
as well as background concerning their historical beginnings in South Carolina, see Stew-
[Vol. 40
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Wyndham, the first suit considered by the court, involved alle-
gations of trespass and waste regarding a particular parcel of
land. Lewis, the plaintiff in the first action, alleged that he con-
trolled the property in question. The defendant, James Wynd-
ham, counterclaimed on the basis of trespass, contending that
his (James') mother held a fee simple absolute title to the land.
The circuit court ruled in favor of Lewis.29
Two years later, Essie Wyndham, James' mother, sought to
quiet title to the same parcel of land. Lewis objected to this sec-
ond suit, claiming that according to the principles of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, Essie was barred from bringing the sub-
sequent action. The trial judge prohibited Essie from initiating
the second suit because she and James were in privity with one
another. The trial court further held that the effect of the for-
mer adjudication concerning the land was binding upon Essie
and James.30 The issue in this case is whether Essie Wyndham
had a full and fair opportunity to be heard in the first suit and,
if not, whether a sufficient privity relationship existed between
Essie and her son that would preclude her from relitigating the
initial suit.
In order to meet the requirements of due process, a litigant
must be given adequate notice31 and an opportunity to be heard.
The facts in Wyndham indicate that Essie never received notice
or opportunity. She did not learn of the initial suit until after
the trial court's decision became final.2
According to Walker v. Williams," an established decision
of the South Carolina Supreme Court, "a party cannot be af-
art, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in South Carolina, 28 S.C.L. REv. 451 (1976).
28. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are two methods by which an adjudica-
tion in one action may affect a subsequent lawsuit. The underlying concept which sup-
ports these principles is aimed at avoiding multiple litigation when parties have earlier
received a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Therefore, the potential for invoking these
doctrines becomes pertinent only if a second suit, involving similar parties or issues to a
previous suit, is initiated. J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER & J. SEXTON, CIvm PRO-
CEDURE 1099 (4th ed. 1985).
29. 292 S.C. at 7, 354 S.E.2d at 579.
30. Id.
31. For an analysis of what constitutes sufficient notice in the due process context,
see Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (due process
requires notice to be reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise inter-
ested parties of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections).
32. 292 S.C. at 7, 354 S.E.2d at 579.
33. 212 S.C. 32, 46 S.E.2d 249 (1948).
1988]
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fected by a proceeding in court to which he was not a party, and
in which he had no opportunity of being heard. 3 4 Furthermore,
it was held in Rabil v. Farris35 that "no estoppel is created by a
judgment against one not a party or privy to the record by par-
ticipation in the trial of the action. ' 3' In Richburg v. Baugh-
man 37 the court, allowing a father to bring a second suit against
a truck driver against whom his daughter had filed an original
suit, stated that the father should be permitted to initiate the
second action because he "had never gotten his day in court."3 "
Since Essie Wyndham was never provided a full and fair op-
portunity to be heard, as required by procedural due process,39
she deserves her "day in court." On the other hand, this lack of
opportunity to be heard may be overlooked if a privity relation-
ship is found to exist between Essie and her son James, such
that James adequately represented his mother's interests in the
initial litigation.
Reversing the trial court's decision, the court of appeals
found that there was absolutely no privity relationship between
Essie and James Wyndham. In doing so, the court relied on the
recent South Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Richburg. [n
Richburg the court held that privity could not be inferred from
the mere existence of a familial relationship: "'Privity' as used
in the context of res judicata or collateral estoppel, does not em-
brace relationships between persons or entities, but rather it
deals with a person's relationship to the subject matter of the
litigation. '40 The court further noted that "[p]rivity does not
typically arise from the relationship between parent and
child.""' Therefore, it is a logical inference from Richburg that
34. Id. at 37, 46 S.E.2d at 251.
35. 213 N.C. 414, 196 S.E. 321 (1938).
36. Id. at 416, 196 S.E. at 322 (emphasis added).
37. 290 S.C. 431, 351 S.E.2d 164 (1986).
38. Id. at 434, 351 S.E.2d at 166.
39. It is necessary, under both the doctrine of collateral estoppel and the doctrine
of res judicata, that the party against whom estoppel is asserted has had his or her legal
interests fully protected in the first trial. "There can be no such privity between persons
as to produce collateral estoppel unless the result can be defended on principles of fun-
damental fairness in the due process sense." 46 AM. Ju& 2D Judgments § 532 (1969).
10. 290 S.C. at 434, 351 S.E.2d at 166 (1986).
41. Id. (citing Sayre v. Crews, 184 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950)); Arsenault v. Carrier,
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the mother-son relationship existing between James Wyndham
(the defendant in the first action) and Essie Wyndham (the
plaintiff in the second action) was not in and of itself sufficient
to create a privity relationship required as a prerequisite to the
estoppel doctrines.
The Wyndham court also found support for its decision in
the North Carolina case of Rabil v. Harris.42 In Rabil the court
held that "[t]he term 'privity' means mutual or successive rela-
tionship to the same rights or property. ' 43 The supreme court
also made reference to its definition of privity previously
adopted in First National Bank of Greenville v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.44: "[P]rivity involves a person so iden-
tified in interest with another that he represents the same legal
right.
45
The court of appeals refused to find that James Wyndham
represented the property interests of his mother in the initial
suit. It reasoned that even though the interests of James and
Essie Wyndham were almost identical, the fact that James did
not claim his interest "through"46 his mother prevented the exis-
tence of privity between them. Upon further analysis of the two
cases, one might observe that the privity issue may not be so
easily dismissed.
47
It appears upon close scrutiny of the circumstances in this
case that a favorable verdict for James in the first suit would
have benefitted Essie. James claimed, as a defense to the origi-
nal trespass action, that his mother held a fee simple absolute
title to the land. It follows that had the court decided in James'
favor, the court effectively would have decided that Essie, in
42. 213 N.C. at 414, 196 S.E. 321 (1938).
43. Id. at 416, 196 S.E. at 322.
44. 207 S.C. 15, 35 S.E.2d 47 (1945).
45. Id. at 26-27, 35 S.E.2d at 58 (emphasis added).
46. "One whose interest is almost identical with that of a party, but who does not
claim through him, is not in privity with him." 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 788 (1969) (em-
phasis added).
47. In addition to the reasons for the court's conclusion that no privity relationship
was involved between Essie and her son, other factors also may have been considered.
For example, no mention was made as to whom financed the original litigation, whether
Essie and her son had an estranged relationship (indicating he was not acting in her
behalf) or a close relationship (possibly indicating the existence of a fraudulent scheme),
what amount of time each party spent on the land, whether time was spent together or
alone, and so forth.
19881
7
Roach et al.: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fact, held a fee simple absolute title to the land. In that in-
stance, Essie could have used the binding effect of the court's
judgment to prohibit Lewis from any further intrusion onto her
land. Therefore, upon first consideration of these circumstances,
it is difficult to imagine that Essie and her son represented
unique interests.48
It is generally accepted, however, that
[p]rivity is not established ... from the mere fact that persons
may happen to be interested in the same question or in proving
or disproving the same state of facts, or because the question
litigated was one which might affect such other person's liabil-
ity as a judicial precedent in a subsequent action. 9
It is not enough that Essie may have benefitted from the first
suit brought by her son if she was not given a fair opportunity to
litigate her interests, either through personal involvement or
through her son's representation as mandated by case law. Be-
cause the facts of this case do not generate support for either of
these two propositions, Essie may not be precluded from bring-
ing her action against Lewis for trespass.
Therefore, it appears that the court's decision in Wyndham
is wholly supported by case law and the principles that form the
basis of the estoppel doctrines. Any other outcome would be
contrary to the underlying purposes of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel: the avoidance of multiple litigation only in those
cases in which parties previously have been given an adequate
opportunity to be heard.
Jeanne M. Nystrom
48. On the other hand, one must also realize that if a general verdict had been
reached in the initial lawsuit, it would have prevented Essie Wyndham from using an
outcome found in favor of James to her own advantage. That is, when a general verdict is
rendered in favor of a defending party, it cannot be determined whether that party won
the case upon the affirmative defense argued or whether his or her opponent simply
failed to meet the requisite burden of proof and, therefore, lost on the merits. Thus, the
benefit to Essie of using a decision found in favor of James in the first lawsuit would not
be possible unless a special verdict was issued, specifically stating that James prevailed
in the lawsuit because his mother possessed a fee simple absolute title to the land.
49. 46 Am. Jun. 2D, supra note 39.
168 [Vol. 40
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III. COURT INTERPRETS RULE 12(b)(6)
In Brown v. Leverette5" the South Carolina Supreme Court
faced a novel question, the interpretation of the final sentence of
Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
The provision in question is as follows:
[I]f on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss
for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of ac-
tion, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the Court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to pre-
sent all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56.51
In July 1979 Beverly Brown was injured when the automo-
bile in which she was a passenger allegedly hit a pothole on an
unpaved road in Lexington County. The Browns (Appellants)
filed a joint action in June 1985 against Dennis Leverette, Floyd
Hodge, and "John Doe" (Respondents) in their individual ca-
pacities for the wife's personal injuries and the husband's loss of
consortium. The complaint alleged that Respondents were
charged with the duty of maintaining the road in Lexington
County and that their negligent performance of this duty caused
the accident and resulting injuries.52
Appellants previously had filed a civil action in June 1981
against the county of Lexington; however, the action was barred
by the one-year statue of limitations contained in South Caro-
lina Code section 57-17-830. The Appellants then brought this
action against the Respondents. Respondents moved to dismiss
the second complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure on the following grounds: (1) the Re-
spondents had no duty to maintain the roads; (2) the statute of
50. 291 S.C. 364, 353 S.E.2d 697 (1987).
51. S.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (emphasis added).
52. 291 S.C. 364, 353 S.E.2d 697 (1987).
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-17-830 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
1988]
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limitations barred the suit; and (3) res judicata and collateral
estoppel precluded the action."'
Respondents submitted affidavits in support of the motion.
These affidavits stated that at the time of the accident, Leve-
rette was not employed in any capacity by Lexington County
and that Hodge was not a motor grader operator in the vicinity
of the accident.5 5 The trial court ruled in favor of Respondents
and dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).51
Appellants contended that the trial court erred in consider-
ing affidavits in ruling on Leverette's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. A
trial court is limited to consulting the complaint in ruling on a
motion for failure to state a cause of action.57 If matters outside
the pleadings are considered, the court must convert the Rule
12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. The trial
court ruled upon the respondents' motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) but did not convert the motion into a motion for
summary judgment.5 8 Although the lower court's order did not
state that it considered the affidavits, the supreme court noted
that the trial court necessarily examined the affidavits to reach
its conclusion. The supreme court reversed the lower court and
held:
[Rule 12(b)(6)] states plainly that the trial court may treat a
12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment and con-
sider matters presented outside of the pleadings if the parties
are afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to such mat-
ters in accordance with Rule 56(c) and (e) of the South Caro-
lina Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice provisions in Rule 56
are incorporated into Rule 12(b)(6)6 °
Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Proce-
dure follows the accepted interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Clearly, under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss for
54. 291 S.C. at 366, 353 S.E.2d at 698.
55. Reply Brief of Respondent at 1.
56. 291 S.C. at 367, 353 S.E.2d at 698.
57. Tele-Communications of Key West v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Hill v. Watford, 276 S.C. 344, 278 S.E.2d 347 (1981).
58. 291 S.C. at 367, 353 S.E.2d at 699.
59. The trial court concluded its order by stating that the defendants had no duty
to maintain the road. 291 S.C. at 367, 353 S.E.2d at 699.
60. Id., 353 S.E.2d at 698-699 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 40
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failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must be
converted into a motion for summary judgment whenever mat-
ters outside the pleading are presented to and accepted by the
court.6 '
The court has complete discretion to accept matters outside
the pleading on a 12(b)(6) motion,62 but once the court accepts
extraneous matters, it must convert the motion to a motion for
summary judgment. A few courts have limited this mandatory
process to the acceptance of items specifically enumerated in
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:6 3 depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits.6 4
Most courts, however, view "matters outside the pleading" as
any written or oral evidence.6 5 Memoranda of points and author-
ities, briefs, and oral arguments are not considered "matters
outside the pleading" under Rule 12(b)(6). 66
Once a court converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment, the court must give the parties notice of the
change in the motion's status and must adhere to the require-
ments of Rule 56. The notice provisions of the rule protect
against surprise and provide an opportunity to defend.67 Parties
61. See Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972); Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d
762 (11th Cir. 1984); Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1984); Prospero Assocs. v.
Burroughs Corp., 714 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Bristol Indus., 690 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1982); Plante v. Shivar, 540 F.2d 1233 (4th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. RAC Corp., 491
F.2d 510 (4th Cir. 1974).
62. See Stein v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1982); Ware v. Associ-
ated Milk Producers, Inc., 614 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1366 (1969).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
64. See Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1952); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 62, § 1366.
65. Concordia v. Bendekovic, 693 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1982). See O'Brien v. Di
Grazia, 544 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v.
Lewisburg Area School Dist., 539 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1976); Smith v. United States, 362
F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1966); Kotarski v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 244 F. Supp. 547 (E.D.
Mich. 1965), aof'd, 372 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1965); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 62,
§ 1366.
66. See Concordia v. Bendekovic, 693 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1982); Richardson v.
Rivers, 335 F.2d 996 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1952);
Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 34 F.R.D. 148 (D.C. Pa.
1963); Patitucci v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 507 (D.C. Pa. 1959); 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 62, § 1366 (1969).
67. See Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762 (11th Cir. 1984); Garaux v. Pulley,
739 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1984); but see Prospero Assocs. v. Burroughs Corp., 714 F.2d 1022,
1024 (10th Cir. 1983) (exception to notice requirement).
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are entitled to ten days notice if a motion for failure to state a
claim is converted to a motion for summary judgment." As a
general rule, noncompliance with the notice provisions of Rule
56(c) deprives the court of authority to grant summary
judgment.0 9
The parties also must be given a reasonable opportunity to
present all evidence pertinent to a Rule 56 motion.7 ° In a
12(b)(6) motion, the moving party must show that there are no
facts that support a legal theory of recovery. Summary judgment
under Rule 56 requires the moving party to show that there ex-
ists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is enti-
tled to the judgment as a matter of law.
In this case of first impression, the South Carolina Supreme
Court's interpretation of the last sentence of Rule 12(b)(6)
clearly follows the accepted interpretation of its counterpart in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court's analysis of the
provision parallels that of other jurisdictions and provides a
clear, definite, and justified precedent. Attorneys must be aware
that submitting affidavits with motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, if accepted, requires the court to convert the mo-
tion into a motion for summary judgment. The rule also requires
the court to give proper notification of the conversion to the
parties.
Julian Hennig, III
IV. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL WAIVED BY FAILING TO MAKE A
TIMELY DEMAND
In King v. Shorter the South Carolina Court of Appeals
adopted the majority approach 2 in determining when a party
68. See Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Bristol Indus., 690
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1982); Hickey v. Arkla Indus., 615 F.2d 239, 240 (4th Cir. 1980).
69. See Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1984); Prospero Assocs. v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 714 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1983); Torres v. First State Bank, 550 F.2d
1255 (10th Cir. 1977); Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 483 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir.
1973).
70. 2A J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE % 12.09[3]
(2d ed. 1985).
71. 291 S.C. 501, 354 S.E.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1987).
72. See, e.g., Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1970);
Bulk Oil (USA), Inc. v. Sun Oil Trading Co., 584 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Steinhardt
Novelty Co. v. Arkay Infants Wear, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 321 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); Waldo Theatre
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has waived his right to a jury trial under Rule 38 of the new
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 38)." In constru-
ing this rule, the court held that the right to trial by jury is
waived7 14 with respect to an issue if not demanded within ten
days after the "last pleading directed to such issue. ' 75 The court
further held that a party is not entitled to a jury trial for issues
raised in amended or supplemental pleadings unless these claims
constitute new factual issues.
71
In King the plaintiff sued Shorter to recover monetary dam-
ageS7 7 because the plaintiff had coendorsed and paid a note for
Shorter. Shorter filed his original answer and counterclaimed,
asserting fraud, breach of trust, and malpractice. Shorter subse-
quently amended his answer and added a counterclaim for out-
rage. Shorter made no demand for a jury trial on either of these
occasions.71 Almost five months after filing his original answer,
Shorter again amended his answer, adding a cause of action for
unfair trade practices. He then demanded a trial by jury within
ten days after he served his second amended answer. 9
At trial Shorter claimed that he was entitled to a jury trial
at least as to the unfair trade practices claim raised in his sec-
ond amended answer. Additionally, Shorter claimed that he was
entitled to a jury trial on all issues raised in his original and
amended answers."
In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals denied
Shorter's demand for a jury trial on any of the issues raised.
Rule 38 prescribes procedures for demanding a jury trial and
Corp. v. Dondis, 1 F.R.D. 685 (D.C. Me. 1941). See also 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MmLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2320 (1971); Annotation, Rule 38 of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Waived Right to Jury Trial as Revived by Amended or Supplemental
Pleadings, 18 A.L.R. FED. 754 (1974).
73. S.C.R. Civ. P. 38. The South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect
on July 1, 1985. S.C.R. Civ. P. 38(b) replaced S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-23-60 (Law. Co-op.
1976). Under § 15-23-60, a party had a right to a jury trial in an action for the recovery
of money without demanding it.
74. S.C.R. Civ. P. 38(d).
75. Id. at 38(b).
76. 291 S.C. at 503, 354 S.E.2d at 403.
77. Under former S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-23-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976), Shorter automati-
cally would have been entitled to a jury trial, in most cases, on all issues without de-
mand. See supra note 73.
78. 291 S.C. at 502, 354 S.E.2d at 403.
79. Record at 35, 45.
80. Id. at 51.
1988]
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reads in pertinent part:
Rule 38(b). Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of
any issue triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other
parties a demand ... not later than 10 days after the service
of the last pleading directed to such issue.
Rule 38(d). Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand
... constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury."1
In stating that Rule 38 is substantially the same as Rule 38 of
the Federal Rules Civil Procedure (Federal Rule 38),82 the court
relied on Trixler Brokerage Co. v. Ralston Purina Co."3 The
King court stated a party's "entitlement to a jury trial on the
issues presented by an amended pleading, when no prior de-
mand for a jury trial has been made, turns on whether the
amended pleadings create new issues of fact."'" The court con-
cluded that the unfair trade practice claim involved essentially
the same factual considerations that were raised by Shorter's
prior pleadings."" Therefore, Shorter was denied a trial by jury
for all issues raised.
The court of appeals did not specifically address the ques-
tion of why the right to trial by jury was waived with respect to
the counterclaims and defenses raised in the original and first
amended answer that were restated in the second amended an-
swer. A literal reading of Rule 38 would seem to dictate that a
demand is timely if made "not later than 10 days after service of
the last pleading directed to such issue."8 An amended or sup-
plemental pleading that restates previously raised issues would
seem to be the "last pleading directed to such issue." Therefore,
a demand for a trial by jury made within ten days after the ser-
vice of the amended pleading would be timely.
81. S.C.R. Civ. P. 38(b). This rule refers only to those issues which are triable of
right by a jury. Hence, a party cannot demand a jury for a purely equitable matter, and,
furthermore, a party does not waive his right by later raising an issue at law in an
amended pleading. Bereslavsley v. Kloeb, 162 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1947).
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 38.
83. 505 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1974). In Trixier the plaintiff did not timely demand a
jury trial on his first five claims in his original complaint. He did make a timely demand
with respect to his sixth and seventh claims raised in an amended complaint. The court,
however, denied a jury trial as to all issues because the new claims did not constitute
new "factual" issues but were merely new theories of recovery. Id.
84. 291 S.C. at 503, 354 S.E.2d at 403.
85. Id.
86. S.C.R. Civ. P. 38(b) (emphasis added).
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Courts almost uniformly have interpreted Federal Rule 38
in conformity with the King holding. 7 In Trixier the Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned that an "issue" for Federal Rule 38(b) purposes is
framed when there has been an allegation and a responsive de-
nial.88 Furthermore, the "last pleading directed to such issue" is
the original responsive denial.89 Therefore, if a jury trial is not
demanded within ten days after the original responsive denial,
the right is waived. Amended or supplemental pleadings, which
merely restate the issues already framed, do not revive the right
to a jury trial.90
The court of appeals did address the question of whether
the issue raised in the second amended answer constituted a new
issue. If the court had categorized this claim as a new issue,
Shorter would have had the right to demand a jury trial for the
new issue only.9 1 In determining whether a new issue was
presented, the court followed the majority trend 2 and the hold-
ing in Trixler.9 s The Trixier court stated that a new issue for
Federal Rule 38(b) purposes means a new issue of fact,9' not a
new theory of recovery.95 Therefore, a new issue is raised by an
amended pleading when a new factual consideration is presented
by the pleading, not when a new theory of recovery is created
based on facts that are already in issue.9s
The interpretation of Rule 38 seems somewhat incongruent
with the liberal interpretations given to the Federal Rules of
87. See Annotation, supra note 72. But see Curry v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 271
F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1959). The Curry court, however, has been criticized for erroneously
applying Rule 38. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILER, supra note 72, § 2320.
88. 505 F.2d at 1050.
89. See sources cited supra note 72.
90. See, e.g., Britt v. Knight Publishing, 42 F.R.D. 593 (D.S.C. 1967); cf. Mulkin v.
Dukinsky, 14 F.R.D. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (court ruled that under FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b) it
had the power to relieve plaintiff of the failure to serve a timely demand where plaintiff
was confused about the last pleading directed to such issue due to a stipulation in an
amended pleading).
91. E.g., Lunza v. Drexel Co., 271 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
92. See cases cited supra note 72.
93. 291 S.C. at 503, 354 S.E.2d at 403.
94. 505 F.2d at 1050.
95. Id. But see Cataldo v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 253 F. Supp. 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (allowing a jury trial in an issue raised in an amended complaint that
amounted to a new theory of recovery and did not raise new factual issues).
96. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pleadings are to be liberally con-




Roach et al.: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Civil Procedure in general. 7 The strict construction of Rule 38,
however, is deliberate on the part of the courts to foster the
goals of judicial economy in the hopes of reducing the size of the
already overcrowded jury dockets.9 8 Through a strict construc-
tion, courts are attempting to limit, but not deny, access to jury
trials. Additionally, courts' disregard of noncompliance with
Rule 38 would delay disposition of cases by creating confusion in
trial dockets, would prejudice opposing parties by injecting an
element of uncertainty into trial strategy and preparation," and
would defeat the purpose of securing "just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination"'100 of every suit.101
The King decision is a warning from the South Carolina
courts that a timely demand must be made after the original
responsive denial to an issue or the right to a jury trial is
waived.10 2 The right to demand a jury trial is not revived by
amended or supplemental pleadings unless the pleadings raise
new factual issues. Even then, this right extends only to the new
issue. The strict construction of Rule 38, which denies access to
jury trials to those who even inadvertently fail to make a timely
demand, 10 3 limits the number of cases on the jury docket. As
long as overcrowding on the jury docket exists, the courts un-
97. Examples of this are FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (pleadings) and FED. R. Civ. P. 15
(amendment).
98. For a discussion of the inefficient jury system and a possible solution, see
Kaunie, One Day/One Trial: A Major Improvement in the Jury System, 67 JUDICATURE
78 (Aug. 1983).
99. Shorter knew the case was on the nonjury docket on September 27, 1985, and
was given notice on November 25, 1985, of the sounding of the nonjury roster to be held
on December 2, 1985. Even so, Shorter waited until December 3, 1985, to formerly de-
mand a jury trial. King filed his complaint on May 17, 1985. Brief of Appellant at 2, 3.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
101. See Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. v. Mack Local, 677, 87 F.R.D. 553 (E.D. Penn.
1980).
102. The court did not address this issue, but S.C.R. Civ. P. 39(b) provides relief
from the strict interpretation of S.C.R. CIm. P. 38(b). Rule 39(b) provides the following:
"[N]otwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury trial ... the court in its
discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury on any or all issues."
103. See, e.g., Bush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1970).
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doubtedly will continue to construe Rule 38 in the same manner.
Alan M. Lipsitz
V. FOREIGN CORPORATION MAY COMMENCE ACTION UNDER
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW PROVIDED IT QUALIFIES TO Do BUSINESS
IN THE STATE PRIOR TO JUDGMENT
In Cost of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Shaw04 the South Carolina
Supreme Court addressed the novel issue of whether a foreign
corporation may maintain an action in South Carolina by quali-
fying to conduct business in this state after commencement of
the action but prior to a judgment. Section 33-23-140(B) of the
South Carolina Code states that "[a] foreign corporation ...
shall not maintain any action, suit, or proceeding in this State
unless and until such corporation shall have been authorized to
do business in this State."'01 5 The court interpreted the word
"maintain" in such a way as to allow an unqualified foreign cor-
poration to commence an action under this statute as long as it
becomes qualified to do business in the state prior to the
judgment. 06
Although not authorized to do business in this state under
section 33-23-10107 of the South Carolina Code, Cost of Wiscon-
sin, Inc. (Cost), a foreign corporation, performed construction
work in South Carolina for Theme Golf, Inc. (Theme Golf).
When Theme Golf failed to pay, Cost filed a mechanic's lien and
on December 17, 1984, filed an action to foreclose on this lien. 08
During the pendency of the action, Cost qualified to conduct
business in South Carolina.
10 9
Theme Golf moved to dismiss the action, asserting that
Cost did not have standing to maintain a suit in South Carolina
because section 33-23-140(B) requires a corporation to be au-
thorized to do business in South Carolina prior to the filing of
an action." 0 The court denied the motion, and the jury returned
104. 292 S.C. 435, 357 S.E.2d 20 (1987).
105. S.C. CODE AN. §33-23-140(B) (Law. Co-op. 1987) (emphasis added).
106. 292 S.C. at 436, 357 S.E.2d at 20-21.
107. S.C. CODE ANN. §33-23-10 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
108. Brief of Respondent at 1.
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id. at 1.
19881
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a verdict against Theme Golf. Theme Golf appealed, contending
that section 33-23-140(B)111 requires a foreign corporation to be
qualified before it can commence an action.
This is a case of first impression in South Carolina. The
court held that the phrase "shall not maintain. . . unless and
until" of section 33-23-140(B) allowed Cost to proceed with its
suit in state court even though it was not authorized to do busi-
ness in South Carolina at the time it filed the action. In so hold-
ing, the supreme court clearly has followed the majority rule.
A majority of the courts have held that although a statute
provides that failure to comply with the terms of the statute
prevents a delinquent corporation from prosecuting, maintain-
ing, or defending a suit, compliance after the action has begun is
sufficient to enable the corporation to maintain or continue the
action. 1 2 Courts of other jurisdictions interpret the words
"maintain" and "prosecute," as used in statutes similar to South
Carolina's section 33-23-140(B), 1 3 as being different in meaning
from the words "institute," "commence," or "begin."1"4 These
courts reason that an action must be commenced before it can
be maintained.1 5
Almost all jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have
held that a foreign corporation's failure to qualify to do business
in the state does not preclude the corporation from maintaining
an action, provided that the corporation qualifies to do business
prior to entry of judgment. 16 A few courts, however, basing their
opinions on the ground that a restriction against maintaining an
111. S.C. CODE ANN. §33-23-140(B) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
112. Annotation, Compliance After Commencement of Action as Affecting Applica-
tion of Statute Denying Access to Courts or Invalidating Contracts Where Corporation
Fails to Comply With Regulatory Statute, 6 A.L.R.3D 326, 329 (1966).
113. S.C. CODE ANN. §33-23-140(B) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
114. Annotation, supra note 112, at 329.
115. Id. at 330.
116. See Empire Excavating Co. v. Maret Dev. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Pa.
1974); Vornado, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 255 F. Supp. 216 (D.N.J. 1966), aff'd, 388
F.2d 117 (3rd Cir. 1968); Capin v. S & H Packing Co., 130 Ariz. 441, 636 P.2d 1223 (Ct.
App. 1981); York & York Constr. Co. v. Alexander, 296 A.2d 710 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972);
Inn Operations, Inc. v. River Hills Motor Inn. Co., 261 Iowa 72, 152 N.W.2d 808 (1967);
Menley & James Laboratories, Ltd. v. Vornado, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 404, 217 A.2d 889
(1966); E. R. Moore Co. v. Ochiltree, 16 Ohio Misc. 45, 239 N.E.2d 242 (1968); Tiffany
Agency of Modeling, Inc. v. Butler, 110 R.I. 568, 295 A.2d 47 (1972); Troyan v. Snelling
& Snelling, Inc., 524 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Video Eng'g Co. v. Foto-Video
Elecs., Inc., 207 Va. 1027, 154 S.E.2d 7 (1967).
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action implies a restraint against beginning it, have held that
compliance after commencement of the action is insufficient.117
The South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted the pre-
vailing majority view. Allowing a foreign corporation to become
qualified after commencement of the action is an equitable and
fair interpretation of the South Carolina statute.
Julian Hennig, III
VI. DISTRICT COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION OVER THE
AWARDING OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AFTER FILING NOTICE OF
APPEAL
In Langham-Hill Petroleum, Inc. v. Southern Fuels Co." 8
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that even after a no-
tice of appeal has been filed, the district court retains jurisdic-
tion to determine the propriety and amount of an award of at-
torney's fees. This decision is consistent with the view embraced
by the majority of the other judicial circuits. 9
The dispute arose when Langham-Hill Petroleum, Inc.
(Langham-Hill), citing Southern Fuel Co.'s (Southern) failure to
perform its obligations under a fixed-price contract for the
purchase of oil, sued for breach of contract. Earlier, Southern
had informed Langham-Hill that due to recent repercussions of
aberrant actions by Saudi Arabia in the world oil market, it
would seek to avoid its obligations by invoking the force ma-
juere clause of the parties' contract. On April 18, 1986, the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland
granted Langham-Hill's motion for summary judgment. On May
5, 1986, Southern timely filed a notice of appeal. The next day,
Langham-Hill petitioned the district court to award attorney's
fees and costs against Southern under Rule 11 of the Federal
117. See E. C. Vogt, Inc. v. Ganley Bros. Co., 185 Minn. 442, 242 N.W. 338 (1932);
Parker v. Lin-Co Producing Co., 197 So. 2d 228 (Miss. 1967); Parke, Davis & Co. v.
Mullett, 245 Mo. 168, 149 S.W. 461 (1912); Annotation, supra note 112, at 338.
118. 813 F.2d 1327 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 99 (1987).
119. See, e.g., Garcia v. Burlington N. R.R., 818 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1987); Thomas
v. Capital Sec. Servs., 812 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1987); Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
784 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 274 (1986); Masalosalo ex rel.
Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1983). See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED
MATTERS § 3915 (1976 & Supp. 1987).
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Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 11).12o After the district court
granted Langham-Hill attorney's fees, Southern appealed, and
both rulings were consolidated into one appeal.121
On appeal Southern argued that once it had filed its notice
of appeal from the summary judgment, the district court no
longer retained jurisdiction over the issue of attorney's fees. In
holding that the district court had proper jurisdiction to deter-
mine attorney's fees, the court of appeals overruled its prior rea-
soning in Wright v. Jackson.122 In Wright the court held that
the district court is divested of jurisdiction over attorney's fees
after notice of appeal has been filed if the "measure of a party's
obstinancy depends on the merits of the case."'12 Arguably,
Wright allowed the district court to retain jurisdiction over at-
torney's fees when that determination was divorced from the
merits. The court pointed out that since Wright, the United
States Supreme Court tangentially had decided the same issue
in White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Se-
curity.124 In White, the Court held that motions for attorney's
fees are not motions to amend judgment and, thus, are not sub-
ject to the ten-day limitation of Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 125 The Court emphasized that "the district
court.., can avoid piecemeal appeals by promptly hearing and
deciding claims to attorney's fees. Such practice normally will
permit appeals from fee awards to be considered together with
any appeal from a final judgment on the merits."' 2  This state-
ment, as the Langham court and a legion of the other circuits
correctly perceived,127 necessarily assumes that after notice of
appeal has been filed, the district court retains jurisdiction over
the disposition of attorney's fees.
Conceptually, the Langham court concurred with the con-
120. When an attorney signs a pleading, motion, or other paper, he certifies that the
action is well founded in fact and law. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides that appropri-
ate sanctions, including the opposition's expenses and attorney's fees, may be imposed
upon an attorney who violates Rule 11.
121. 813 F.2d at 1329.
122. 522 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1975).
123. Id. at 958.
124. 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) provides: "A motion to attack or amend a judgment shall
be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."
126. 455 U.S. at 454.
127. See cases cited supra note 119.
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clusions in White that the issues involved in deciding attorney's
fees are "collateral to the main cause of action" 128 and, thus, dis-
tinct from any discussion of the merits of the case. Moreover,
awards of attorney's fees "are not compensation for the injury
giving rise to an action" 129 and, therefore, are not an element of
",relief."130
Interestingly, White involved the award of attorney's fees
pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976,131 a statute that provides "fees only to a 'prevailing
party.' "1132 This statutory standard obviates consideration of the
merits, for as the White Court pointed out, "[r]egardless of
when attorney's fees are requested, the court's decision of enti-
tlement to fees will therefore require an inquiry separate from
the decision on the merits-an inquiry that cannot even com-
mence until one party has 'prevailed.' ,,13 On a pragmatic level,
the Langham court endorsed the fears expressed in White that
if the district court's jurisdiction of attorney's fees were depen-
dent on the jurisdiction of the merits, "litigants would request
attorney's fees in every motion they argued out of fear that the
motion would become the final judgment of the case thus pre-
cluding later requests."'3 4
While granting the district courts this residual jurisdiction,
the court offered guidelines to ensure timely disposition of the
attorney's fees issue. The court was confident that, in their dis-
cretion, trial judges would deny fees when "a post-judgement
[sic] motion unfairly surprises or prejudices the affected
party." ' 5 Finally, the court encouraged prompt ruling on fee
awards at the lower level and consolidation of appeals from fee
awards and appeals from final judgments on the merits.'38
The decision's logic depends on an underlying determina-
tion of when a judgment is final. As the Fourth Circuit previ-
128. 455 U.S. at 451.
129. Id. at 452.
130. Id.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
132. 455 U.S. at 451.
133. Id. at 451-52.
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ously noted in Bernstein ex rel. Bernstein v. Menard,137 White
indicated that an undecided determination of attorney's fees did
not affect a judgment's finality. 38 Finality established, the next
step was whether, after a final judgment was appealed, the dis-
trict court retained jurisdiction to award attorney's fees and
costs. The Wright approach was that the district court retained
postappeal jurisdiction of attorney's fees only when its determi-
nation did not depend on the merits of the case. When consider-
ation of attorney's fees necessarily involved concomitant evalua-
tion of the merits, the district court must rule on them "while
the merits are before it."'139 The chief value of following White,
as Langham did, is the procedural certainty it provides with a
clear-cut rule.14 0 A Wright-type rule would involve time-consum-
ing forays into the fine points of the nexus between the merits of
each case and the award of attorney's fees.1
Yet, there are serious problems accompanying the fashion-
ing of a uniform rule: courts create clarity by discarding certain
cloths of efficiency and fairness. In most cases, determination of
attorney's fees necessarily involves a determination of the mer-
its. Indeed, the calculus for computing statutory fees commonly
includes consideration of the merits.142 This is especially true in
a Rule 11 request, the precise situation in Langham. A Rule 11
sanction is proper when a party asserts claims that are "neither
supported by fact nor warranted by existing law,"' 43 viz., the
merits. If, for example, the appeal from the merits and the ap-
peal from the attorney's fees award are not consolidated at the
appellate stage, "there may be ...unnecessary duplication at
the appeals level.' 44 In reality, however, duplication may exist
137. 728 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 253.
139. 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975). The court stated that this fee assessment
must be made either prior to appeal or on remand after the merits have been settled. Id.
140. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 119, § 3915.
141. Id. at 322 (uniform rule on finality would "forestall the need to engage in sub-
stantial litigation to distinguish cases in which attorney's fees are collateral from those in
which they are not"); see also International Ass'n of Bridge Structural, Ornamental, &
Reinforcing Ironworkers' Local Union 75 v. Madison Indus., 733 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1984).
142. Such variables include the complexity of the legal questions involved in the
merits and the skill thereby required. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973).
143. Langham, 813 F.2d at 1330.
144. 5 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 119, at 314.
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even when there is consolidation, given the chronologically
unique nature of each determination.
Another scenario of inefficiency could have occurred under
the facts of the Langham case itself. The court of appeals con-
ceivably could decide a first appeal from summary judgment at
the same time the district court was considering the merits of
the case in the context of an award of attorney's fees. If the
court of appeals reversed, chaos and waste would ensue from the
fact that two courts simultaneously reached opposite results." 5
Finally, the court ignores one fairness consideration in
Langham. If the judgment is final and appealable, although the
propriety and amount of an attorney's fees award has not been
addressed, the losing party is put in a position of "uncertainty
and consequent unfairness ...when she must decide whether
to appeal without complete knowledge of the scope of
liability.' 1 46
The court in Langham states a uniform rule which provides
that although a judgment is final and appealable despite the
nondisposition of attorney's fees, the district court retains juris-
diction to hear and rule on the fee issue. The decision satisfies
the unstated policy of certainty in judgments. 47 By establishing
this baseline rule, however, the Langham court overlooks the vi-
tal dependency that many fee awards have on the merits of each
case, a reality implicit in the Wright approach. 148 Nevertheless,
given the tremendous influx of statutory provisions for attor-
ney's fees,149 the decision is helpful to the practitioner.
David Garrison Hill
145. This reality is adumbrated in Masalosalo ex rel. Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins.
Co., 718 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1983) (Choy, J., dissenting).
146. Green, From Here to Attorney's Fees: Certainty, Efficiency, and Fairness in
the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 COnNELL L. REv. 207, 243 (1984).
147. See generally Green, supra note 146 (arguing that the better rule is that judg-
ment is not final until resolution of fee issues, yet acknowledging the need for a uniform
rule).
148. E.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir. 1985) (dis-
tinctions between nature of fee awards "altogether too metaphysical").
149. Over one hundred federal statutes provide for the recovery of attorney's fees.
See Green, supra note 146, at 217-18 (quoting 6 FED. ATToRNEY FEE AwARDs REP., No. 5,
at 2-3 (Aug. 1983)).
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VII. THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY EXPANDED IN SOUTH
CAROLINA
Adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure in
1985 did not directly affect the right to a jury trial; however,
adoption of the compulsory counterclaim rule, a procedural
change, had an impact on that right.15 A recent line of supreme
court cases has addressed the resulting uncertainties.
Prior to 1985 the plaintiff, by his choice of a legal or equita-
ble cause of action,15 exercised much control over the mode of
trial. In cases in which the plaintiff asserted both legal and equi-
table claims, a jury trial was unlikely. The courts either deter-
mined that the primary cause of action was an equitable one or
had the discretion to try the equitable claim first. In either case,
the equitable "clean up" doctrine could be used to try the entire
case without a jury." 2
Although a defendant could file a motion forcing election of
remedies, the choice of which to pursue was the plaintiff's.' In
addition, the defendant's introduction of a legal counterclaim
did not affect the parties' right to a jury trial; in fact, he waived
his right to a jury trial merely by asserting a counterclaim. 5"
150. S.C.R. Civ. P. 13. (S.C.R. Civ. P. 38 merely preserved the right. Prior to the
adoption of the new rules of civil procedure, the right to a jury trial was preserved by
S.C. CODE ANN. §15-23-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1985).
151. H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 10, 189 (1935).
152. Id. at 189.
153. Johnson v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 292 S.C. 51, 354 S.E.2d 895 (1987);
Landvest Assocs. v. Owens, 276 S.C. 22, 274 S.E.2d 433 (1981); Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249
S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967). The applicability of this rule under the new rules of civil
procedure was recently affirmed by the court of appeals in Harper v. Ethridge, 290 S.C.
112, 348 S.E.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1986). Under the new procedural rules, a plaintiff may
plead inconsistent claims. Previously, state law focused primarily on inconsistencies in
causes of action as requiring an election. Because pleading inconsistent causes of action
is no longer discouraged, the Ethridge court reasoned that the plaintiff should not be
compelled to elect between causes of action at the pleading stage. Id. at 120, 348 S.E.2d
at 379. A case could now go to the jury on all causes of action; however, in order to
prevent double recovery, the plaintiff must elect a remedy before judgment is entered.
Id. at 121, 348 S.E.2d at 379.
This modification, however, is not applicable when "the complaint joins legal and
equitable causes of action requiring different modes of trial and involving substantially
different remedies and proof of damages." Id. at 122, 348 S.E.2d at 380. In such situa-
tions, a traditional application of the doctrine is appropriate with the exception that the
time of election is within the trial judge's discretion. Id. Thus, the doctrine may prevent
a plaintiff from having his legal claims tried to a jury.
154. John D. Hollingsworth on Wheels, Inc. v. Arkon Corp., 273 S.C. 461, 257 S.E.2d
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina has addressed the
right to jury trial in light of the recent procedural changes. In
C&S Real Estate Services v. Massengale155 the court held that a
defendant, in an equitable action, was entitled to a jury trial
when he raised a legal, compulsory counterclaim. In Johnson v.
South Carolina National Bank5 ' the court addressed the plain-
tiff's right to a jury trial when he asserted an equitable claim
and the defendant introduced a legal, compulsory counterclaim.
As a result of the holdings in these two cases, when a defendant
raises a legal, compulsory counterclaim, either party now is enti-
tled to a jury trial. 57 Additionally, the court makes it clear in
Johnson that when common issues of fact exist, the legal claim
must be tried first.158 This also represents a significant change.
Previously, the trial judge could determine the dispositive claim
first. 5 9 This was usually the equitable claim; collateral estoppel
then generally precluded the necessity of a jury trial on the legal
issue.
The implications of these decisions are uncertain. Inter-
preted broadly, these cases hint that the right to a jury trial may
arise whenever legal claims are raised and that the legal claims
are to be tried to the jury first. Thus, these cases suggest that a
jury trial is more likely when the complaint raises both legal and
equitable claims.
Massengale was the first case to address the effect of the
compulsory counterclaim rule on the right to a jury trial.160 The
plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage; since the complaint was
essentially an equitable one, no right to a jury trial arose.' 6' The
appellant, defendant in the original action, sought a jury trial on
all of her counterclaims. 62 The trial court determined that one
of the counterclaims was compulsory and that Massengale was
entitled to jury trial on it. 6 ' The five remaining counterclaims,
165 (1979). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-15-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1985).
155. 290 S.C. 299, 350 S.E.2d 191 (1986).
156. 292 S.C. 51, 354 S.E.2d 895 (1987).
157. Id. at 56, 354 S.E.2d at 897.
158. Id.
159. Miller v. British Am. Assurance Co., 238 S.C. 94, 119 S.E.2d 527 (1961).
160. 299 S.C. at 302, 350 S.E.2d at 193.
161. Id. at 300, 350 S.E.2d at 192.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 301, 350 S.E.2d at 193.
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however, were either permissive or equitable, and the defendant
was not entitled to a jury trial with respect to them.""
In the absence of a compulsory counterclaim requirement,
the courts presumed that the defendant waived his right to a
jury trial by electing to bring a legal counterclaim.1 6 5 Under the
new rules, a defendant is required to plead as a counterclaim
any claim arising out of the same transaction as the original
claim. 166 Since the compulsory assertion of a legal counterclaim
cannot be viewed as a waiver of a constitutional right, the ra-
tionale for the prior case law no longer holds. The supreme court
resolved this anomaly by holding that a defendant will now be
entitled to a jury trial when he raises a legal, compulsory
counterclaim. 67
Cognizant of the questions raised by the adoption of Rule
13, the court, in dicta, outlined the following procedure for de-
termining when a party will be entitled to a jury trial:
(1) If both the complaint and the counterclaim are in equity,
the entire matter is triable by the court.
(2) If both are at law, the issues are triable by a jury.
(3) If the complaint is equitable and the counterclaim is legal
and permissive, the defendant waives his right to a jury trial.
(4) If the complaint is equitable and the counterclaim legal
and compulsory, the defendant has the right to a jury trial on
the counterclaim. In that case, the proper procedure is as
follows:
(a) The trial judge should, pursuant to Rule 42(b),
order separate trials of legal and equitable claims.
(b) The judge must then determine which issues are
164. Id.
165. John D. Hollingsworth on Wheels, Inc. v. Arkon Corp., 273 S.C. at 463, 257
S.E.2d at 166 (1979).
166. S.C.R.Civ. P. 13(a) provides:
Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction ....
Id.
167. 290 S.C. at 301, 350 S.E.2d at 193. Cf. North Carolina Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. DAV Corp., 294 S.C. 27, 362 S.E.2d 308 (Ct. App. 1987). Subsequent to C&S and
Johnson, the court of appeals restricted the right to a jury trial by narrowly defining
compulsory counterclaim. Thus, in DAV Corp. the court denied the defendant's demand
for a jury trial because the court considered his counterclaim permissive.
[Vol. 40
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to be tried first.
(c) If there are factual issues common to both claims,
absent the "most imperative circumstances," . . . the "at
law" claim must be tried first. The clerk of court shall
immediately place the "at law" action at the top of the
trial roster.
(d) If there are no common factual issues, it is within
the trial judge's discretion which claim will be tried
first.
168
Five months after .its decision in Massengale, the court
again addressed issues relating to the effect of Rule 13(a). In
Johnson69 the court held that either party could demand a jury
trial when the defendant raised a legal and compulsory counter-
claim. Furthermore, the court reaffirmed its position that legal
issues must be tried first when there are issues common to both
the legal and equitable claims. 170
Johnson involved a suit against a bank for rescission of a
guaranty agreement. The plaintiffs originally sought an equita-
ble remedy, as well as money damages for outrage, invasion of
legal right, and breach of fiduciary duty.'-' The defendant forced
the plaintiffs to elect between the legal and equitable reme-
dies.17 2 In his order forcing election, the trial judge stated that if
it is the plaintiffs' choice to proceed on the equitable cause of
action, "the other causes of action for outrageous conduct and




The plaintiffs elected to proceed on the theory of rescission, and
the defendant moved for an order transferring the case to the
nonjury roster. 74 Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed the judge's
168. 290 S.C. at 301-02, 350 S.E.2d at 193 (quoting Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. West-
over, 359 U.S. 500 (1959)) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
169. 292 S.C. 51, 354 S.E.2d 895 (1987).
170. Id. at 55, 354 S.E.2d at 897.
171. Id. at 52, 354 S.E.2d at 898.
172. Johnson v. South Carolina Natl Bank, 285 S.C. 80, 328 S.E.2d 75 (1985), rev'd,
292 S.C. 51, 354 S.E.2d 895 (1987).
173. 285 S.C. at 81, 328 S.E.2d at 76. The trial judge apparently forced the plaintiff
to elect between legal and equitable remedies in accordance with the doctrine of election
of remedies. Once the plaintiff chose to pursue an equitable remedy, the judge allowed
her to maintain the legal issues in the same complaint. Plaintiff would have forfeited her
right to a jury trial on the legal issues, and the trial judge would have decided those
issues as incident to the equitable claim.
174. Id. at 81, 328 S.E.2d at 76.
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order granting that motion.'1 5
The court then considered the issue of whether plaintiffs
were entitled to a jury trial and held that because the main pur-
pose of the complaint was equitable, the plaintiffs were not. 76
On remand the plaintiffs refiled their complaint, and the de-
fendant then filed a compulsory counterclaim at law for damages
under the guaranty agreement.' 7 The plaintiff, in turn, de-
manded a jury trial on the counterclaim, but the circuit court
struck the plaintiff's motion.'1 8 On appeal, the court held that
(1) when a counterclaim is compulsory and legal, either party is
entitled to a jury trial and (2) when there are factual issues com-
mon to both the equitable and legal claims, the "legal issues are
to be determined first, and then the findings of the jury are
binding on the sitting judge, as trier of the equitable claims."'7
It is important to note that the plaintiffs-counter defend-
ants originally chose to pursue an equitable remedy. 80 The
court could have accepted the argument that the plaintiffs had
already waived their right to a jury trial by electing an equitable
remedy.181 Instead, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled
to a jury trial on the compulsory, legal counterclaim generated
by the equitable claim.
8 2
The logical question that follows Massengale and Johnson
is whether the next extension of this analysis allows different
modes of trial when legal and equitable claims are joined by the
plaintiff. A broad interpretation of Johnson indicates such rights
may exist.
Presently in South Carolina, a plaintiff is not necessarily en-
titled to a jury trial when both legal and equitable claims are
included in the complaint. Two methods are currently available
for dealing with this situation: (1) an equitable clean-up and (2)
the election of remedies. Each of these methods results in a very
conservative view of the right to trial by jury.
Arguably, a third alternative now exists: whenever there are
175. Id. at 82, 328 S.E.2d at 77.
176. Id.
177. 292 S.C. at 52-53, 354 S.E.2d at 896.
178. Id. at 55, 354 S.E.2d at 897.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 52, 354 S.E.2d at 895.
181. Id. at 54, 354 S.E.2d at 896.
182. Id. at 53, 354 S.E.2d at 896.
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legal and equitable issues in a single proceeding, whether in the
complaint or a compulsory counterclaim, both parties are enti-
tled to a trial by jury of the legal issues. The supreme court's
decision in Johnson to allow either plaintiff or defendant the
right to a jury trial on a legal, compulsory counterclaim leads to
the conclusion that this right must exist whenever a legal claim
is raised by necessity, Whether the court intends to apply John-
son this broadly is uncertain.
There are persuasive reasons for extending the right to a
jury trial in South Carolina. Underlying policy reasons include
encouraging the joinder and resolution of all claims in one ac-
tion, a stated purpose of the new rules.183 Additionally, litigants
will have greater procedural flexibility. Just as the defendant is
forced to bring a compulsory counterclaim in order to promote
judicial efficiency, a plaintiff also is under pressure to assert all
possible related claims. The fortuitous existence of a compul-
sory, legal counterclaim should not dictate whether or not the
right to trial by jury exists.
The development of the right to a jury trial in the federal
system is interesting for purposes of analysis, particularly in
view of the fact that South Carolina's new rules are modeled on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' The federal courts once
adhered to a view of the right to a jury trial similar to that pre-
viously held by South Carolina courts; procedural changes incor-
porated in the Federal Rules and the merger of law and equity,
however, prompted changes.8 5 First, in Beacon Theaters v.
Westover, 86 the United States Supreme Court held that the
joinder of legal and equitable claims in the same action cannot
183. H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, supra note 151, at 190 (1985).
184. Id. at 4. In Pelfrey v. Bank of Greer, 270 S.C. 691, 244 S.E.2d 315 (1978), the
state supreme court held that the right to a jury trial did not arise in a shareholder's
derivative action that raised legal claims. Since the action historically was conceived of
as an equitable one, the state constitution does not require the right to trial by jury. In
the federal system, on the other hand, the Supreme Court held in Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531 (1970), that the right to a jury trial did arise in shareholder's derivative action
raising legal claims. The South Carolina Supreme Court held in Pelfrey that Ross was
not binding on state courts since the seventh amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, which concerns the right to a jury trial, had never been made binding on state
courts.
185. See J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE% 38.16 (1987); 9 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302 (1971).
186. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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deprive a party of his right to a jury trial.187 Thus, when legal
and equitable issues are included in a single action, neither try-
ing the issues of fact as incidental to the equitable issues nor
trying the common issues to the court first, may operate to in-
fringe upon the right to a jury trial.188
In Dairy Queen v. Wood'89 the United States Supreme
Court held that when a complaint raises both legal and equita-
ble claims, the right arises with respect to the legal claims. Addi-
tionally, the Court reiterated its position that when common is-
sues of fact exist, the legal claims must be tried first.19 0
The South Carolina Supreme Court has expanded the right
to a jury trial. An underlying reason for this expansion is the
erosion of the doctrine of waiver. Because South Carolina's new
compulsory counterclaim rule may force a defendant to bring a
legal counterclaim,191 a defendant cannot be considered to have
waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. Moreover, re-
jecting the argument that a plaintiff waives his right to a jury
when he raises only equitable issues in his complaint, the court
held that the plaintiff has the right to a jury trial when the de-
fendant brings a legal, compulsory counterclaim.9 2 In either
case, the right should not be infringed upon by the doctrine of
preclusion.
9 3
A logical extension of this reasoning may result in a right to
trial by jury whenever a legal claim exists by necessity. Thus,
when the complaint raises both legal and equitable claims, a
right to trial by jury may arise.
Barbara E. Brunson
187. Id. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469 (1962).
188. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959). See also Ross, 396
U.S. at 537-38; Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 473.
189. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). See also Ross, 396 U.S. 531 (extending the right to share-
holder's derivative action raising both legal and equitable claims in the complaint).
190. 369 U.S. at 479.
191. 290 S.C. at 301, 350 S.E.2d at 193.
192. 292 S.C. at 54, 354 S.E.2d at 896.
193. Id. at 55, 354 S.E.2d at 897.
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VIII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIOR CASE DETERMINATION IN
COMBINED LEGAL AND EQUITABLE CLAIMS - DIVERGENCE IN THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
In an apparent shift away from established principles,"" the
Fourth Circuit determined that the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel need not involve a prior suit but can be applied using a deci-
sion from a second cause of action decided in that same suit.
Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College195 establishes the pro-
position that collateral estoppel precludes litigation of factual is-
sues before a jury that were determined at a bench trial in a
federal district court, even though the plaintiff's initial loss of
the opportunity to litigate those issues before a jury resulted
from judicial error. This decision by the Fourth Circuit is dia-
metrically opposed to a Seventh Circuit ruling made only two
weeks later in Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co.' The Sev-
enth Circuit refused to invoke collateral estoppel in a case strik-
ingly similar to Ritter.
Both Ritter and Hussein involved combined legal and equi-
table claims for which the plaintiffs sought redress. In both cases
the court dismissed the legal claims, and a judge, sitting as
factfinder, decided the equitable claims. The court of appeals re-
versed, respectively, the dismissals of the legal claims, and Rit-
ter and Hussein sought rehearing by a jury. The Fourth Circuit
denied Ritter a jury trial based on collateral estoppel.197 The
Seventh Circuit determined, however, that collateral estoppel
did not apply and remanded Hussein's suit for a retrial by a
jury.19
194. See, e.g., 1B J. MOORE, J. LUcAS & T. CURRIER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.441-0.448 (2d ed. 1988 & 1987-88 Supp.). See also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A.
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.9 658 (1985), which states
[T]he law of collateral estoppel is ground in notions that the finality of judg-
ments must be preserved and that judicial economy demands that cases not be
retried continually. . . . Thus, issue preclusion operates to simply dispute res-
olution by considering the original court's determination on specific issues to
be binding; any subsequent litigation between the parties, even on different
claims, will be limited to only those issues being presented for the first time.
Id. at 658 (footnotes omitted).
195. 814 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 260 (1987).
196. 816 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1987).
197. 814 F.2d at 988.
198. 816 F.2d at 350.
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Mrs. Ritter alleged sex and age discrimination against her
employer, Mount St. Mary's College, under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),199 the Equal Pay Act of 1964
(EPA),20 0 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) °.20 Both the EPA claim and the ADEA claim would
have allowed a jury trial on the issues. The district court, how-
ever, dismissed these legal claims and conducted a bench trial on
the equitable claim under Title VII. The court decided in favor
of the college; Ritter appealed. On appeal the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals set aside the dismissal of Ritter's EPA and
ADEA claims as erroneous and remanded them for further con-
sideration, while upholding the Title VII determination. In ex-
amining the issues presented on remand, the lower court deter-
mined that the claims of discrimination in the EPA claim and
ADEA claim were substantially decided in the Title VII claim.
Using the basis of collateral estoppel as its determinant, the
court granted summary judgment on both claims despite Ritter's
request to vacate the Title VII judgment and rehear the case
before a jury. She contended that since judicial error caused the
denial of a jury trial, her claim now should properly be
presented before a jury. On subsequent appeal, the court dis-
agreed and stated:
The appellant also argues that, because collateral estoppel
is "collateral," it should only serve to preclude the relitigation
of issues determined in a prior suit, and because the issue
presented in this case involves the use of estoppel within the
same suit, the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not apply.
It is indeed true that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
was designed to bar the relitigation of issues determined in a
prior suit. The "prior suit" notion merely reflects, however, the
usual circumstance under which the issue of whether to apply
collateral estoppel arises. The prior suit "requirement" pro-
tects no interests that are relevant to this suit.
20 2
The Seventh Circuit distinctly disagreed with this idea. In
Hussein, the plaintiff alleged racial discrimination against his
employer, Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., and sought relief under Ti-
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
200. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
201. Id. §§ 621-34.
202. 814 F.2d at 991-92 (emphasis in original).
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tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,203 and section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.2o4 In a bench trial, the lower court dis-
missed his legal claim under section 1981 and decided against
him on his Title VII claim. The court of appeals upheld the Ti-
tle VII decision, reversed the dismissal of the section 1981 claim,
and remanded the case for determination by a jury by stating:
We cannot sanction an application of collateral estoppel which
would permit findings made by a court in an equitable pro-
ceeding to bar further litigation of a legal issue that had been
properly joined with the equitable issue when those findings
were made only because the district court erroneously dis-
missed the plaintiff's legal claim. 0 5
The Seventh Circuit's well-reasoned opinion stands in stark con-
trast to the opinion set forth by the Fourth Circuit.
Courts recognize and accept the concept of collateral estop-
pel as a means of preserving final judgments while contributing
to judicial economy.2 06 Its use arises in cases that involve issues
which have been previously decided and ended in a valid and
final judgment when that determination is essential to the judg-
ment. 07 By allowing a prior decision to stand in a subsequent
action, the court spends less of its time relitigating matters al-
ready determined.
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with the con-
cept of collateral estoppel on many occasions.20 8 The recent case
203. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
204. Id. § 1981.
205. 816 F.2d at 356-57.
206. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MLLER, supra note 194, at 658.
207. "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determina-
tion is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a
different claim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
208. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (offensive use of
collateral estoppel); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (Court stated in dicta that
although res judicata was inapplicable, collateral estoppel might be appropriate in bank-
ruptcy proceeding that followed a state court collection decision); Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) (United States is collaterally estopped from challenging prior
judgment of Montana Supreme Court); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (recognized concepts of judicial economy and protec-
tion from relitigation of identical issue settled in a prior suit); Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469 (1962) (when right to jury trial may be collaterally estopped, court should, when
possible, examine legal issues prior to equitable claims); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333
U.S. 591 (1948) (Court created narrowly-focused standard in applying collateral
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of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore20 9 discussed the offensive use
of collateral estoppel. In that case the Court determined that a
prior decision in a nonjury trial could be the basis for collateral
estoppel of a later suit involving the same issues even though the
second suit would have allowed the issues to be decided by a
jury. The Court grappled with the apparent denial of the appel-
lant's seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Its decision, how-
ever, "foreclose[d] the petitioners from relitigating the factual
issues determined against them in the [prior] action, [and] noth-
ing in the Seventh Amendment dictates a different result.
'210
In Montana v. United States the Court stated that
[a] fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embod-
ied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judi-
cata, is that a "right, question or fact distinctly put in issue
and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction
... cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same
parties or their privies." '
Collateral estoppel has been applied in many South Caro-
lina decisions. The court of appeals defined collateral estoppel in
Patterson v. Goldsmith as "preclud[ing] a party and his privy
from relitigating an issue which was outcome determinative in
previous litigation. 2 12 The South Carolina Supreme Court in
Cannon v. Cannon213 acknowledged the expense of relitigation
and recognized the legislative intent to use collateral estoppel in
certain instances as an answer to that expense.21
Other courts also have joined in the use of collateral estop-
pel to promote judicial economy.215 For example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, stated
that "[t]he doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata ordi-
estoppel),
209. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
210. Id. at 337.
211. 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (quoting Southern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 168
U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897)).
212. 292 S.C. 619, 623-24, 358 S.E.2d 163, 166 (1987).
213. 278 S.C. 346, 349, 295 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1982).
214. Id. at 349, 295 S.E.2d at 877.
215. See, e.g., Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 705 F.2d 1515 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081 (1984); Church of Scientology v. Linberg, 529 F.
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narily provide adequate assurance that one court's resolution of
a controversy will be respected by other courts. 2 16 The common
thread tying all these decisions together is the concept of a
"prior suit"217 or a decision by "other courts. ' 18 In order to use
a previous determination of issues to collaterally estop the reliti-
gation of those issues, the judgment asserted must be valid and
final.219
. The Hussein court recognized the need for a valid and final
judgment before collateral estoppel could prevent litigation of
the plaintiff's legal claim.220 The fact that the equitable claim on
which the employer relied was part of the same case before the
court indicated that the issue was not finally decided; the case
was still open for appeal. For that reason, the court concluded
that the issue could not fairly be used to deprive Hussein of a
jury determination of his legal claims. Conversely, the Ritter
court used its decision in the same case on the equitable claim to
preclude determination of the plaintiff's legal claim by a jury,
thereby depriving her of her seventh amendment right to jury
trial.
The United States Supreme Court discussed the importance
of preserving the right to a jury trial in Beacon Theatres v.
Westover.2 1 In Beacon a lower court, in trying the plaintiff's eq-
uitable claim, prevented a full jury trial of a legal counterclaim
and crossclaim. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because
"'[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such im-
portance and occupies so firm a place in our history and juris-
prudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury
216. 705 F.2d 155, 1524 (9th Cir. 1983).
217. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) ("prior
judgment"); id. at 331 ("the second action"); Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,
504 (1959) ("subsequent trial"); United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1177
(6th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 464 U.S. 165 (1964) ("prior lawsuit"); J. Aron & Co. v. Service
Transp. Co., 515 F. Supp. 428, 434 (D. Md. 1981) ("second suit"); Church of Scientology
v. Linberg, 529 F. Supp. 945, 962 (C.D. Ca. 1981) ("prior decision"); Patterson v. Gold-
smith, 292 S.C. 619, 623, 358 S.E.2d 163, 166 (1987) ("previous litigation"); Cannon v.
Cannon, 278 S.C. 346, 349, 295 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1982) ("separate action"); Garret v.
Snedigar, 293 S.C. 176, 186, 359 S.E.2d 283, 288 (Ct. App. 1987) ("former proceeding").
218. See, e.g., 705 F.2d at 1524.
219. See supra note 207.
220. 816 F.2d at 356.
221. 359 U.S. 500, 503-04 (1959) (suit for declaratory judgment to settle key issues
of a potential antitrust suit, counterclaim raised matters that allowed for treble damages
and a jury trial).
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trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.' ",222 The Court
acknowledged the trial court's discretion in deciding which
claims, legal or equitable, should be tried first. The Court cau-
tioned, however, that the discretion is very narrowly limited,
since the "right to a jury trial is a constitutional one, ' 223 and
whenever possible, the court's discretion must "be exercised to
preserve jury trial.
'2 24
In Ritter the plaintiff was denied a jury trial. The Fourth
Circuit court trivialized her loss of a jury determination of her
claim. Comparing Mrs. Ritter's claim to the claim set forth in
Parklane, the court stated that "[tihe fact that the judge in this
case was in error in dismissing the legal claims, whereas in Park-
lane the estoppel arose form a prior, separate suit, is irrele-
vant.'" 221 The difference between Parklane and Ritter, however,
is in the presence or lack of a final, valid judgment. Mrs. Ritter's
claim was still open for appeal; the prior suit referred to in
Parkiane was final in every sense of the word. The Seventh Cir-
cuit in Hussein recognized this distinction and refused to allow a
judgment that was open for appeal to dictate the outcome of a
separate claim that involved the same issues.
Allowing an appealable judgment on an equitable claim to
preclude litigation of a legal claim before a jury could lead to
inaccurate or defective decisions. In some cases, it will also lead
to a result that frustrates judicial economy. For instance, what
might happen if, in the interest of judicial economy, a second
cause of action relied upon the decision of a first cause of action,
which is later reversed? The judicial economy sought would be
lost. Not only would the first cause of action need to be reheard,
but the second claim would also need to be relitigated. The
judge-made rule of collateral estoppel was created to eliminate
such a problem by requiring that any prior decision relied upon
be final.
The result set forth in Ritter is a difficult one to square with
previous treatments of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. A clar-
ification from the Fourth Circuit, or from a future Supreme
Court analysis of the divergent opinions among the circuits, will
222. Id. at 501 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
223. Id. at 510.
224. Id.
225. 814 F.2d at 991.
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be necessary before this decision can be accepted as reliable case
law.
Pamella A. Seay
IX. JUDGMENT CREDITORS DENIED INTEREST DURING PENDENCY
OF APPEAL
Three recent South Carolina cases have dealt with the ac-
crual of interest during the pendency of an appeal. Two South
Carolina Supreme Court cases, Sears v. Fowler226 and Barth v.
Barth,227 agree that a judgment creditor is not entitled to inter-
est during pendency of an appeal when the verdict is later up-
held.228 A subsequent court of appeals decision, Republic Textile
Equipment Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 2 2 9 agreed with the su-
preme court's opinions, although the court of appeals referred to
the controversy by a different name.
In Sears a judgment creditor appealed from a judgment in
her favor, claiming that the judgment was inadequate. The
court, however, reversed the lower court's award of interest dur-
ing the pendency of the appeal. In Barth the family court
awarded the plaintiff a sum that she considered inadequate. The
court of appeals awarded her interest on the judgment during
the pendency of her appeal. The supreme court reversed.
Republic Textile purported to deal with prejudgment inter-
est. The term "prejudgment interest" as used by the South Car-
olina Court of Appeals in Republic Textile is a misnomer. In
that case, a judgment had been rendered. The controversy lay in
whether interest should accrue from the date of the initial judg-
ment or from the date of the final outcome on appeal. In that
respect, although the court of appeals called it by a different
name, the subject is the same as in Sears and Barth.
The current South Carolina Code sets a legal rate of interest
on judgments: "All money decrees and judgments of courts en-
rolled or entered shall draw interest according to law. The legal
interest shall be at the rate of fourteen percent per annum. '230
226. 293 S.C. 43, 358 S.E.2d 574 (1987).
227. 293 S.C. 305, 360 S.E.2d 309 (1987).
228. See 293 S.C. at 310, 360 S.E.2d at 311; 293 S.C. at 46, 358 S.E.2d at 575.
229. 293 S.C. 381, 360 S.E.2d 540 (Ct. App. 1987).
230. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-20(B) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
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Even though the statutory language implies mandatory applica-
tion, "the statute does not automatically apply in every case."23 1
For instance, the statute does not apply when parties contract
for a different rate.2 32 Additionally, the statute does not explic-
itly address "the question of interest continuing to run on a
judgment during the pendency of appeal. 21 33 The court in Barth
interpreted this to mean that "the General Assembly did not
consider in this statute, the running of interest on an appeal by
an unsuccessful judgment creditor. 234 The current statute, as
interpreted by the supreme court, does not extend through the
period when a judgment creditor appeals an insufficient
judgment.
Although certainly not a unique situation, this particular
problem has not been litigated extensively. Under former law in
South Carolina, interest ran from the date of the first decree."3 5
If the decree was appealed, the date from which interest ran re-
mained the date of the first decree. Under the common law,
"judgments did not bear interest."23
The United States Supreme Court faced this problem in
Bates v. Dresser.37 In that case interest was allowed from the
date of the decree in the district court through the date that the
judgment creditor appealed. The reason cited by the Court was
that the judgment creditor's appeal interposed a delay.238
When the delay in receiving a judgment from a judgment
debtor is caused by the judgment creditor's own actions, it is
inconsistent with notions of fairness to reward that delay when,
on appeal, the initial judgment is upheld. If, however, the delay
is caused by the judgment debtor, the problem becomes very dif-
231. 293 S.C. at 45, 358 S.E.2d at 575.
232. Id.
233. 293 S.C. at 309, 360 S.E.2d at 310.
234. Id. at 309, 360 S.E.2d at 311.
235. "In all money decrees and judgments of courts enrolled or entered; in all cases
of accounts stated, in all cases where any sum or sums of money shall be ascertained, and
being due, shall draw interest, the legal interest shall be at the rate of seven percent per
annum." Brown v. Rogers, 76 S.C. 180, 181, 56 S.E. 680, 681 (1907) (quoting S.C. CODE OF
Civ. P. § 1660 (1902)).
236. 293 S.C. at 45, 358 S.E.2d 575.
237. 251 U.S. 524 (1920) (bill in equity brought by the receiver of a national bank
charging its former president and directors with loss of assets through theft by an
employee).
238. Id. at 532.
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ferent. No longer is it a question of the judgment creditor's de-
lay. Denial of interest in that instance also would be unfair.
When both judgment debtor and judgment creditor appeal, the
problem is compounded.
Further discussion of the importance of the delay factor was
set forth by the Missouri Court of Appeals in State v. City of St.
Louis.231 The court stressed that delay in finality of the judg-
ment was caused by the judgment creditor's own act. Since the
judgment creditor deliberately prolonged the proceeding, the
court would not reward him for that delay with additional inter-
est on the judgment. 240 The Supreme Court of Missouri in
Jesser v. Mayfair Hotel, Inc.241 reiterated that analysis and clar-
ified it, stating that "[w]here a judgment creditor appeals on the
grounds of inadequacy from a recovery in his favor, and the
judgment is affirmed, he is not entitled to interest pending the
appeal.
2 42
Although there is a split of opinion among states addressing
this issue,243 the concern over delay seems to be the common ra-
tionale on which the majority of cases are based: "The reason
most frequently given for the majority's position is that the pur-
pose of postjudgment interest is to penalize nonpayment of a
judgment by a judgment debtor.
2 44
The South Carolina Supreme Court follows this majority
approach.245 In Sears only the judgment creditor appealed; in
239. 234 Mo. App. 209, 115 S.W.2d 513 (1938).
240. Id. at 213, 115 S.W.2d at 515.
But where it is the judgment creditor himself who is dissatisfied, and he ap-
peals upon the ground of what he conceives to be the inadequacy of the judg-
ment which was rendered in his favor, then if the judgment is affirmed he is
held not to be entitled to interest on the judgment pending the disposition of
the appeal, since it was by his own act that the proceeding was delayed and
prolonged until such time as judicial sanction of the correctness of the judg-
ment finally culminated in its affirmance by the appellate court.
Id.
241. 360 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. 1962).
242. Id. at 665.
243. 293 S.C. at 309, 360 S.E.2d at 311; 293 S.C. at 45, 358 S.E.2d at 575.
244. 293 S.C. at 45, 358 S.E.2d at 575.
245. See id. at 46, 358 S.E. at 575. "A judgment creditor who appeals based on the
insufficiency of the verdict is not entitled to interest during the pendency of the appeal
when the verdict is later upheld." Id. "[I]nterest does not accrue during appeal when the
appeal is made by the judgment creditor on the basis of a claim of inadequacy and the
finding is upheld." 293 S.C. at 310, 360 S.E.2d at 311.
1988]
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Barth and Republic Textile both judgment debtor and judg-
ment creditor appealed. These decisions appear to be a fair de-
termination by the court to deal with a difficult problem.
Pamella A. Seay
X. SOUTH CAROLINA COURTS MAY ASSERT SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OVER REHABILITATORS OF FOREIGN DELINQUENT
INSURERS
In Smalls v. Weed246 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
faced the issue of whether the Insurers' Supervision, Rehabilita-
tion, and Liquidation Act 247 deprived South Carolina courts of
subject matter jurisdiction over rehabilitators of foreign delin-
quent insurers. Determining that South Carolina's version of the
Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act245 did not preclude the asser-
tion of subject matter jurisdiction, the court upheld the trial
court's order denying defendant Weed's motion to dismiss. The
decision represents a straight-forward application of well-settled
rules of statutory construction, and the result reflects the reluc-
tance most courts display when asked to refrain from exercising
jurisdiction.
In February 1983 Smalls procured an insurance policy from
Cherokee Insurance Company, a Tennessee insurer, to insure a
log skidder against, among other things, fire. Smalls' skidder
subsequently was destroyed by fire. On July 17, 1984, nearly
three months after Smalls' loss, a Tennessee court entered an
order placing Cherokee in rehabilitation. Three days later
246. 293 S.C. 364, 360 S.E.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam).
247. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-5-1810 to -2500 (Law. Co-op. 1976). In an attempt to
better organize the statutory provisions dealing with insurance matters, the South Caro-
lina General Assembly recodified Title 38 effective January 1, 1988. See 1987 S.C. Acts
155. The Insurers' Supervision, Rehabilitation, and Liquidation Act was transcribed to
Chapter 27 and now appears as S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-27-10 to -1000 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987). The provisions construed in resolving the controversy between Smalls and Weed
were not altered. Thus, for the remainder of this discussion, the relevant sections will be
cited as they appear as a result of 1987 S.C. Acts 155.
248. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-27-10 to -1000 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). It is interesting
to note that although the court of appeals refers to these sections as "South Carolina's
version of the Uniform Insurer's Liquidation Act," 293 S.C. at 366, 360 S.E.2d at 532, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws does not consider South
Carolina to be among the states that have adopted the act. See UNIF. INSURERS LIQUIDA-
TION ACr, 13 U.L.A. 321 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
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Smalls filed a proof of loss regarding the skidder. On November
5, 1984, Weed, the court-appointed rehabilitator, rejected
Smalls' claim.
Smalls then brought suit in South Carolina against Weed as
Cherokee's rehabilitator, alleging breach of contract, bad faith
refusal to pay insurance benefits, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Smalls served Weed with the summons and
complaint by service upon the South Carolina Insurance Com-
missioner.2 4 Weed appeared specially, presenting numerous
grounds for dismissal. The trial court rejected Weed's arguments
and asserted its jurisdiction over him as Cherokee's
rehabilitator. 50
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision,
holding that Weed had waived his right to question the court's
jurisdiction over his person.2 51 The court reasoned that Weed
had implicitly acknowledged the jurisdiction of the court by
raising issues that only a court with jurisdiction over the parties
would have authority to decide.25 2 The court recognized that
special appearances had been eliminated by the adoption of the
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure but found that the
"new rules" had no impact upon its reasoning.25 3
249. Every insurer, before being licensed in South Carolina, must appoint the South
Carolina Insurance Commissioner as its attorney for the purpose of receiving service of
process. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-5-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). In fact, service made against
a foreign insurer in any other way is invalid. See id.; Livingston v. South Carolina Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 254 S.C. 161, 174 S.E.2d 163 (1970). As Cherokee's rehabilitator,
Weed held title to all of the insurer's assets. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-9-115(b) (1980);
see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-27-320, -330 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). Thus, as the trial
court ruled, because service on the Insurance Commissioner was effective against Chero-
kee, it was also effective against Weed, Cherokee's rehabilitator. Record at 17.
250. Record at 17.
251. Smalls v. Weed, 291 S.C. 258, 353 S.E.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam).
252. Id. at 261, 353 S.E.2d at 156.
253. Id. The South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1985,
governing all proceedings in civil actions brought after that date "and also all further
proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court
their application in a particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be
feasible or would work injustice." S.C.R. Civ. P. 86(a). Weed's motion to dismiss was
heard on July 10, 1985, and thus the "new rules" should have governed unless the court
thought their application would have been unjust or unfeasible. Neither the trial court
nor the court of appeals even implied that applying the "new rules" would have been
unfair. Had the court of appeals correctly applied Rule 12(b), Weed could not have been
found to have waived his right to object to the court's jurisdiction over his person be-
cause "[n]o defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other de-
fenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion." S.C.R. CIv. P. 12(b). It is proper
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On Weed's appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the court of appeals.2 54 The supreme court
ordered the lower court to consider whether the Insurers' Super-
vision, Rehabilitation, and Liquidation Act 255 deprived the trial
court of subject matter jurisdiction. 56
On remand the court of appeals again affirmed the trial
court's decision. 57 The court found no statutory provision that
would deprive South Carolina courts of subject matter jurisdic-
tion against rehabilitators 56 The opinion points out that the
legislature clearly provided for "one procedure in actions involv-
ing a rehabilitator, and for a different procedure against a liqui-
dator."25 The provision governing actions by and against
rehabilitators 260 merely provides for a stay of ninety days in the
case of actions pending when an order of rehabilitation is filed;
it does not, the court posited, prohibit actions against
rehabilitators. 26'1 The court noted the contrasting provision for
actions by and against liquidators26 2 and then cited "the primary
rule of [statutory] construction," which requires that legislative
intent prevail if it can be discovered.263 Having previously cited
"the general rule [that] statutes which deprive a court of juris-
diction are to be strictly construed, 26 4 the court concluded that
the legislature had intended that an action such as Smalls'
to assert the lack of the court's jurisdiction over the person or subject matter by motion
before serving a responsive pleading. Id. Thus, the court of appeals should have ad-
dressed the merits of Weed's objection to the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction. Its
decision that Weed "waived" this jurisdictional objection is precisely what the "new
rules" were designed to prevent. See S.C.R. Crv. P. 12 reporter's notes ("Rule 12(b)...
eliminates the necessity of the awkward 'special appearance to object to jurisdiction'
. ... "). Nevertheless, the trial court's ruling should have been affirmed because Weed,
standing in Cherokee's shoes as its rehabilitator, clearly had the requisite minimum con-
tacts with South Carolina. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945).
254. Smalls v. Weed, 292 S.C. 408, 356 S.E.2d 843 (1987).
255. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 38-27-10 to -1000 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
256. 292 S.C. 408, 356 S.E.2d 843.
257. Smalls v. Weed, 293 S.C. 364, 360 S.E.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam).
258. Id. at 371, 360 S.E.2d at 535.
259. Id. at 370, 360 S.E.2d at 534.
260. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-27-340 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
261. 293 S.C. at 369, 360 S.E.2d at 533.
262. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-27-430 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
263. 293 S.C. at 370, 360 S.E.2d at 534.
264. Id. at 368, 360 S.E.2d at 533.
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might be brought. 6 5
The reasoning embraced by the court of appeals is sound.
The rules of statutory construction applied by the court are well
settled and widely accepted.266 Weed probably would prevail in a
state whose statutory provisions more closely parallel the Uni-
form Insurers Liquidation Act.267 Weed's position, however,
failed to recognize the differences in South Carolina's corre-
sponding act.26 s The court of appeals ably interpreted South
Carolina's version and accordingly rejected Weed's argument.
Robert Wilson, III
265. Id. at 370-71, 360 S.E.2d at 534.
266. See, e.g., 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 321 (1953) ("fundamental rule of construction
. . . is that the court shall.. . ascertain and give effect... to the intention or purpose
of the legislature"); 73 AM. Ju. 2D Statutes § 145 (1974) (legislative intent is controlling
factor).
267. The Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (UILA) gives resident claimants, with
disputed claims against delinquent insurers domiciled in a reciprocal state, two options:
either prove the claim in the domiciliary state or if ancillary proceedings have been com-
menced in the resident's state, in those proceedings. See UNIF. INSuRERs LIQUIDATION
AcT § 5, 13 U.L.A. 346 (1986). The procedure is the same whether the insurance com-
pany is in rehabilitation or in liquidation. See id. § 1(2), 13 U.L.A. 328. Thus, because
ancillary proceedings had not commenced in South Carolina, under the UILA Smalls
would have been forced to sue Weed in Tennessee, Cherokee's domiciliary state. When
the South Carolina General Assembly enacted section 5 of the UILA, it made only one
change. Compare UNIF. INsURERS LIQUIDATION AcT § 5, 13 U.L.A. 345 (1986) (beginning
"In a delinquency proceeding") with S.C. CODE: ANN. § 38-27-970 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987) (beginning "In a liquidation proceeding"). Thus, in South Carolina, resident claim-
ants are only limited to the two options found in the UILA when the insurer is in liqui-
dation. Perhaps this important difference helps explain why the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws does not consider South Carolina to be among
the states that have adopted the UILA. See supra note 248.
268. See supra note 267.
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